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 ABSTRACTS      
                                 
Harry Lesser (University of Manchester): “Kant on human imperfection” 
 
One of the features of Kant’s religion is his belief in universal human imperfection, or even 
“radical evil”: we are not totally corrupt, or incapable of acting rightly, but we are corrupt enough 
to find it difficult. This belief has some important consequences for his ethical theory, which have 
been noticed before now, but have received insufficient attention. 
 
Most importantly, Kant holds that morality applies only to corrupt rational beings, such as 
humans. Beings with a holy will, such as God, do not consider what they “ought” to do, but simply 
consider what is good and do it. The good appears as an “ought” only if there is a possibility of 
not wanting to do it, as is the case with humans. Not only is it always possible that one will not 
want to do what is right, but it is almost certain that sometimes this will be the case, and quite 
certain that one does not have the kind of control over one’s emotions that would enable one to 
guarantee that one will always want to do what is good. This explains why Kant adopts the 
disturbing view that only the sense of “ought” can be the proper moral motivation. To act out of 
love is beautiful, but not safe as our only motive, because it is not in our power to love others at 
all times; but it is in our power to preserve the sense of duty. My paper will argue that this thesis 
of Kant’s, which derives from his religious views, can also be defended on empirical grounds, and 
is in fact correct. 




Stijn Van Impe (Ghent University, Belgium): “On The Immanence and Transcendence of Kant’s 
Realm of Ends and Ethical Commonwealth: The unsolved dilemma of human autonomy and 
divine grace.” 
 
This paper focuses on the tension field of human autonomy and divine grace within the 
framework of the immanence and the transcendence of Kant’s ‘Realm of Ends’ (‘Reich der 
Zwecke’), ‘Realm of Grace’ (‘Reich der Gnaden’) or ‘Ethical Commonwealth’ (‘ethisches 
gemeines Wesen’). The contribution starts by presenting a survey of and a commentary on Kant’s 
different accounts and definitions of his ideal of an ethical community as elaborated in passages 
from Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787), Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), 
Lectures on Ethics (1784-1785), On a Discovery According to which Any New Critique of Pure 
Reason Has Been Made Superfluous by an Earlier One (1790) and Religion within the Bounds of 
Mere Reason (1793). Second, an exposition will be given concerning the precise significance and 
the paradoxical interaction of human autonomy and divine grace for the foundation or 
accomplishment as well as the completion or destination of Kant’s ethical community. It will be 
shown that the discussed themes gain an apparently different importance following the 
Groundwork or the Religion. Third, a twofold reading and interpretation of Kant’s ethical 
community as both immanent and transcendent will be presented in a way that links such an 
approach to the broader frame of Kant’s ethico-theology, that is, to the transition in Kant’s moral 
system from ‘ethical ought’ to ‘religious hope’. The paper will be concluded by pointing out some 
unsolved philosophical burdens in interpreting and understanding the described relations. Also, 
some prospects for future investigation will be spelled out concerning the legitimate possibilities 
within Kant’s philosophy to substitute the role of divine grace for an ethical community by Kant’s – 
present-day more attractive – ideas of ‘autocracy’ and ‘sensus communis moralis’. 
Courtney Fugate (Catholic University Leuven, Belgium): “The Postulation of God’s Existence 
as an Act of Moral Autonomy.” 
 
Kant’s postulation of God’s existence, and his subsequent claims that we must regard all 
duties as divine commands, are often thought to corrupt the moral incentive and to undermine 
his conception of freedom as autonomy. In his commentary, Lewis White Beck has managed 
to avoid these conclusions, but only at the price of degrading moral postulation to a mere 
requirement of consistent theoretical reasoning without an ounce of real practical significance 
– a conclusion clearly at odds with Kant’s own intent. Allen Wood also avoids these 
difficulties, but in order to do so he is forced to prefer arguments found only in Kant’s 
unpublished notes and lectures to those that Kant specifically authorizes in the second 
Critique and elsewhere. Furthermore, Wood’s strategy, like Beck’s, fails to provide the act of 
postulation with any genuine moral significance. 
 
The difficulties encountered by these commentators, I will argue, stem from their failure to 
take seriously Kant’s restriction of the argument to a subjective significance in the penultimate 
section of the Dialectic of the second Critique. Based upon a reading of this section, as well a 
few key passages from the Fortschritte essay, I will show that: 1) The images of God as moral 
architect and as holy law-giver belong to a larger world-image that is specifically constructed 
to be maximally conducive to the cultivation of virtue if held to be true by the moral agent. 2) 
Kant thinks that this world-image is an entirely free construction of reason as a whole, i.e., a) 
it is the rule for conceiving the world that would naturally spring from theoretical and practical 
reason in conjunction were they authorized to project such an image, and b) reason is indeed 
free to do so since this world-image concerns the supersensible. 3) Since this image 
increases the moral incentive (how will take some explanation), and indirectly furthers the 
cultivation of virtue, the act of freely affirming (postulating) God’s existence, and the existence 
of the object of this world-image in general, is itself an act with moral significance, indeed it is 
one through which reason as a whole freely asserts the rule of its own nature, i.e., it is a 
specific and very special act of autonomy through which the theoretical and pure practical 
employments of reason for the first time freely combine to form a unity. In conclusion, I will 





Professor Stephen R. Palmquist (Hong Kong Baptist University): “Kant’s Religious Argument 
for the Existence of God.” 
 
Kant is well known as the philosopher who virtually destroyed the three traditional ways of 
attempting to prove God’s existence: the ontological, cosmological and physico-theological (or 
teleological) arguments. That he believed these could be replaced by his own “moral” 
argument, albeit carrying a more qualified practical validity than the absolute proof that is the 
goal of theoretical arguments, is also commonly understood. What has never been 
recognized is that in Book Three of Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason Kant provides 
a further argument for God’s existence, one that is specifically aimed at and based on the 
necessity of organized religion for the ultimate fulfillment of humanity’s moral quest. Kant 
argues that victory over the evil in human nature can be obtained only through participation in 
a moral community, that making such a community work is a universal duty of mankind, and 
that the purpose of such a community cannot be achieved without giving it a religious 
orientation by postulating God as an internal moral lawgiver to all participants. Belief in God, 
as the Lawgiver of a moral community that sees itself as a “People of God”, thereby becomes 
a duty for all persons who wish to avoid despair in their commitment to do all they can to bring 
about the kingdom of ends. 
                    
 
